Using a new dataset, Investing Across Borders 2010, on selected regulations that govern foreign direct investment (FDI) in 87 countries, and direct investment they receive from 30 OECD source countries, this paper explores how much FDI-specic policies and institutions inuence FDI inows when rms are heterogeneous in terms of productivity. The analysis overhauls conventional estimation techniques by directly addressing biases resulting from country and rm selection. The paper nds evidence of substantial heterogeneity bias in the eects of distance and related policy barriers on the inow of FDI. Controlling for rm heterogeneity and country selection, as well as key determinants of FDI like market size, a statistically signicant relationship is found between FDI regulations and the value of inward direct investment. However, when the quality of logistics infrastructure is accounted for, the salience of FDI regulations diminishes. For a clear source of identication when correcting for selection biases, the paper uses another new indicator of the number of days and procedures required to establish a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary.
Introduction
The earlier literature focused on why multinational enterprises (MNEs) locate in countries that they do at an aggregate industry level. Dunning (1993) , for example, suggested that rms with ownership advantages have an incentive to become multi-national rms as they seek to internalize their proprietary assets (technology, brand, distributional eciency) while exploiting location-specic advantages such as market size or access to factors of production (cheap labor, abundant resources). In fact, most FDI can be grouped into being either market-seeking (horizontal FDI) or eciency-seeking (vertical FDI). The former is guided by the present or potential market size of the host country and its neighbors, and the latter is inuenced by wages, quality of infrastructure, taxes, and other micro-incentives. The nature of trade and exchange rate regimes, and the economies of agglomeration also inuence the decision of foreign companies on where to locate (Blonigen 2005) .
Firms may also combine vertical and horizontal models of FDI. Activities are split across geography based on diering skill intensities at the same time there are multiple production units of the same good taking advantage of non-rivalrous intra-rm knowledge assets. Termed the knowledge-capital model, it was rst proposed by Markusen (1997) . The vertical model suggests that trade and FDI are complements; the horizontal model suggests they are substitutes; and, loosely, the knowledge-capital model suggests that trade and FDI tend to be substitutes for similar countries and complements for those with dierent factor proportions.
Recent work on the heterogeneous characteristics of individual rms has blurred the distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI. According to Helpman (2006) , the new theories do not replace comparative advantage as a basis for inter-sectoral trade and FDI, but the focus on the organizational choices of the rm helps answer questions such as what type of rms choose to serve foreign markets and how? For example, if the liberalization of trade or investment reduces marginal costs, not only can rms trade or invest more, but new rms can participate in foreign trade or investment as the productivity cut-o required to do so falls (in Figure   1 , the prot schedules π I and π X swivel backwards). Baldwin and Gu (2003) found that 4.5 percent reduction in Canada-US taris increased rms' propensity to export by 63 percent.
One contribution of this paper is to internalize this stylized fact that it is only the most productive rms in a given country that can meet the xed costs of investing abroad in a gravity model by decomposing FDI ow into its intensive margin (investment per rm) and extensive margin (number of rms). This leads us to revise elasticities associated with policy and physical barriers to trade and investment in traditional gravity models, and assess more accurately how important country-specic policies and institutions can be in a model that takes into account the two margins of investment ow.
In the absence of a consensus model with general equilibrium features tied with microeconomic decision making, it is dicult to analyze the impact of specic government policies on FDI after controlling for the underlying changes in its long-run determinants (Blonigen 2005) . There exists, thus, a large body of econometric literature on the partial equilibrium analysis of exogenous factors aecting FDI decisions on where to locate.
They consider as short-run determinants of FDI such factors as macroeconomic fundamentals, policy incentives, or the pull of agglomeration eects (Markusen and Maskus 2001) . In particular, the roles played by institutions, Figure 1 : Sorting of rms by productivity policy barriers, exchange rates, and taxes tend to overlap extensively across studies (Chakrabarti 2001) .
Intuitively, open policies and the quality of institutions can be expected to be correlated positively with FDI ows. Equity limits or bans, expropriation risks, lack of enforcement of contracts, absence of the rule of law, poor provision of public goods, over-regulation, and unreasonable costs of doing business because of corruption or inept bureaucracies are likely to deter private activities, domestic or foreign. In general, poor institutions are shown to adversely aect FDI decisions, but the pitfalls in measuring as broad a universe as institutions has made it dicult to establish it as a denitive explanatory variable for FDI performance. Wei (2000a) analyzes bilateral FDI ows from 12 source countries to 45 host countries and nds both corruption and tax rates on multinational rms to aect inward FDI negatively. While the literature under-emphasizes the role of taxes because of transfer pricing, double taxation treaties, and several other ways that rms minimize tax burden, corruption appears to be an enduring variable of interest. But, corruption could merely be a proxy for poor institutional quality. If statutory or procedural restrictions on FDI are fuelling corruption then the coecients of corruption obtained in FDI regressions could be exaggerated by capturing other aspects of institutional quality.
8 Wei (2000b) seeks to remedy this by introducing measures of FDI restrictions, as well as incentives, in an empirical test of the eect of corruption on FDI. While an important rst step, the author acknowledges his coding of incentives and restrictions on FDI to be coarse and limited to less than 50 countries.
He nds the inuence of corruption on FDI to decrease somewhat, but retain its signicance. 9 Wheeler and 8 Likewise, if FDI incentives are compensating for the hurdle of corruption, ignoring the eect of incentives in FDI regressions downplays the inuence of corruption.
9 To put the results in context, Wei states that an increase in corruption from a Singaporean to a Mexican level has the same eect of deterring FDI as an increase in tax rate by 50 percentage points.
Mody (1992) consider a list of 13 variables to represent institutional quality, and 9 variables to represent openness, and show both to be insignicant determinants of FDI. Such indices with many constituents, however, have a high noise-to-signal ratio.
There are no uniform indicators for institutional or regulatory quality that is consistently comparable across countries. Several papers, therefore, have used an array of existing indices or created their own. Daude and Stein (2007) The fourth is the set of information obtained from the World Business Environment Survey regarding taxes and regulations, policy instability, corruption, crime, anti-competitive practices, etc. Having regressed this diverse range of institution variables (one at a time to avoid multi-collinearity) in a simple gravity framework, the authors nd institutional variables like regulatory burden to be an important determinant of FDI location. This partial equilibrium literature, however, has not yet addressed the problem of sample selection that arises when the pairing of exporting (or FDI-sending) and importing (FDI-receiving) countries does not occur randomly partly because poor countries are less likely to keep veriable data. Neither has it taken into consideration the fact that not all rms are built the same way, and who trades or invests depends crucially on their ability to meet sunk costs of engaging abroad. In this paper, I redress these biases, and aim to arrive at more accurate estimates of some important drivers of FDI, especially openness and institutions, by using novel indicators plucked from a comprehensive dataset on FDI regulations.
Model
A theoretically-grounded gravity equation for FDI ows is derived to pave the way for an empirical estimation (see Appendix A for details). The derivation adapts to FDI ows the trade versions of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) , and Behar and Nelson (2009b 
Production: A rm in country i produces one unit of output with a cost-minimizing combination of inputs (c i a) where a indicates rm-specic productivity and measures the number of bundles of the country's inputs used per unit of output; c i is the cost of the bundle, which is uniform across country i. There is no strategic interaction among rms. Each maximizes prot as follows:
From (1), δxi
and substituting in (2), the optimal price has a constant mark-up over the marginal cost:
Investment cost across borders: Multinational rms in country i seeking to sell goods in country j through horizontal FDI face price and demand in country j. Serving the foreign market through FDI (instead of exports) reduces transport costs, but adds non-trivial coordination and transaction costs represented by τ ij , in addition to the xed cost of setting up a new plant which is assumed to exceed the xed cost of exporting (see Appendix B). Price in country j diers from price in country i because it includes a bilateral mark-up and transaction costs:
Take E j = Y j . Substituting (4) in a rm's prot schedule, and using (1), we get:
Sale by rms in country i, whose productivities vary, are protable in j only when π ij > 0. This gives the cut-o productivity a ij as follows:
Equation (6) gives the extensive margin of FDI. The cut-o a ij is higher, i.e., the number of rms from country i that invest abroad increases when the GDP (Y j ) of host country increases and the xed and variable costs of undertaking FDI fall. Total value of FDI from i to j is given by the following equation, where G(a ij )
indicates the fraction of rms that are in a position to invest abroad (a ij > a L ) and N (i) is the number of such rms.
Substituting for p j and x j , and characterizing
General equilibrium: Assuming total income of country i is a summation of sales by all its rms at home and abroad.
Outward multi-lateral resistance is dened as
where Y is the total world income. The augmented gravity equation now becomes:
Equation (9) is the gravity equation which predicts FDI ows from i to j. FDI increases with the joint incomes of the two countries and decreases with xed and variable transaction costs in undertaking FDI. There is also the term V ij to capture the fraction of rms that are able to undertake FDI. Omitting this term biases estimates in standard gravity equation. Importantly, bilateral FDI between i and j depends on FDI barriers on i across all host countries, known as the outward multi-lateral resistance (Π i ). Similarly, P j aggregates all barriers facing FDI into j and is called the inward multilateral resistance. This is the generalized counterpart to the trade version of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) .
As explained in Appendix C, Helpman et al. (2008) make a distributional assumption about rm productivity, and derive a parametric equation that is estimated by using non-linear least squares (NLS). They also suggest an alternative approach of directly controlling for the extensive margin (V ij ) by exploiting its increasing monotonic relationship with the latent variable, Z ij , which is the ratio of variable prots from undertaking FDI for the most productive rm (a L ) to the xed cost of undertaking FDI from country i to j.
Because the benchmark OLS results in this paper (Tables 1 and 2) yield similar results to the NLS coecients in Table 9 , I choose not to make a distributional assumption about rm productivity, but instead approximate the extensive margin with a polynomial inẑ ij which is an estimate of the latent variable. Where doesẑ ij come from? In (5), positive prots are obtained, and therefore positive FDI ows are witnessed when Z ij > 1. Ifp ij is the predicted probability of FDI from i to j, obtained from the Probit equation (13), the wellknown Heckman correction for sample selection requires the construction of the inverse Mills ratio, η ij = φ(ẑij ) Φ(ẑij )
, to control for the selection of country pairs into having an FDI relationship where predicted values of the latent variable,ẑ ij = Φ −1 (p ij ). Helpman et al. (2008) show thatẑ ij =ẑ ij + η ij is mapped to a consistent estimate of the latent variable, or the number of rms protable enough to invest abroad.
Empirical Methodology
It is evident that forces that shape trade and investment are similar. In fact, like trade, bilateral FDI is determined by relative (not only bilateral) investment costs: i's FDI into j not only depends on the barrier to market entry that j poses, but also the barriers posed by all other partners. So, FDI is decreasing in bilateral barriers relative to the average barriers of the two countries with all other partners. In the atheoretical gravity equation, FDI between i and j is simply determined by barriers posed by each other. Ignoring the multilateral resistance terms creates an omitted variables bias. In cross section regressions with aggregate trade or FDI data, multilateral resistance and national incomes can be captured by host and home country xed eects (Shepherd 2008 ).
The theoretically-derived gravity equation (9) is now estimated empirically in its log-linear form. In equation (11), ϕ i captures all variables with subscript i as a xed eect for the FDI source country. In cross-sectional data, host country xed eects should be used to capture their income or expenditure (GDP) and inward multilateral resistance. However, this is a quasi xed-eects model where host countries are not assigned dummies because one purpose of the paper is to examine how country-specic FDI-relevant policies and institutions aect the attraction of FDI in a single cross-section. ϕ j therefore amalgamates host country GDP and inward multilateral resistance (σ − 1)lnP j + lnY j . Technically, remoteness or the inward regulatory restrictions are not identical to the inward multi-lateral resistance which depends, among others, on world prices and the elasticity of substitution (Shepherd 2008) . However, prevented from using xed eects for the host country, attempt is made to approximate it as closely as possible by the inward regulatory barriers to FDI, and the remoteness index.
10 10 Remoteness of country i is the sum of GDP-weighted bilateral distances with all its partners = j =i The empirical strategy proceeds in four steps. First, I estimate the log-linearized gravity equation (12) using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method with standard gravity and key explanatory variables representing policy and institutions related to FDI. This is the benchmark regression without correcting for biases. Second, I
correct for the rst bias country selection resulting from dropping country pairs that have zero ows. I do so by estimating the following Probit model (13) to predict the probability of countries having an FDI relationship conditional on the standard explanatory variables introduced in (12). This is to compute the inverse Mills ratio ( η ij ) which is then included as an additional regressor in the augmented gravity model. I also use the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood technique proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) as an alternative way to address the problem of dropping country pairs with zero ows.
Third, I take into account rm heterogeneity by incorporating controls derived from the predicted probability in an FDI-ow equation using both the nonlinear least-squares (NLS) and the ordinary least-squares (OLS)
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Based on an informal analysis by Kusisami Hornberger: of the nearly 100,000 FDI greeneld projects listed in the fDi Markets methods. Fourth, the biases that are corrected in the preceding step are disentangled to assess the relative dominance of biases from sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity. As in Helpman et al. (2008) for trade, I nd that unobserved heterogeneity capture almost all the bias in the standard gravity model, highlighting the importance of controlling for the extensive margin (proportion of FDI-undertaking rms).
Exclusion Restrictions
Correcting for selection and heterogeneity biases involves two steps. First is the Probit estimation (13) to obtain the inverse Mills for inclusion in the second stage estimation. To prevent the identication from relying on assumptions of joint normality in the errors in the rst and second stage, a newly constructed indicator the number of days and procedures to establish a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary is included in the rst stage, but not in the second stage. This variable aects the probability of two countries engaging in an FDI relationship, but is assumed not to inuence the amount of FDI once the investor has decided to locate in the host country. In other words, the identifying variable resembles a xed cost, instead of a per unit variable cost of investing.
In Table 6 , alternative identifying variables are also used. A strong candidate for the exclusion (identifying) variable is the presence of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between two countries. Conceptually, however, this is a weaker identifying variable because a BIT could aect the intensive margin of FDI, not just the decision of whether to invest. A rm that is already present in the host country may not invest as much as it wishes in the absence of protections aorded by an enforceable legal instrument like the BIT. Upon signing of a BIT, and possible risk mitigation, the formerly guarded investor could increase the amount of its investment. My default exclusion variable is therefore an index constructed by averaging normalized scores of, i) the number of preand post-incorporation procedural steps involved in establishing a whlolly foreign-owned subsidiary, and ii) the number of days needed to go through each of the procedural steps. 12 This is a true sunk cost for undertaking FDI which has to be borne irrespective of the amount invested, and unlikely to aect subsequent increment in investments.
Endogeneity
When looking at the relationship between FDI regulations and FDI inows, we need to worry about possible reverse causality between them. Instead of regulations on FDI causing greater FDI inow, could improved regulation be a response by governments to low levels of FDI? Reverse causality between FDI-related institutions and FDI inows is less of a problem because institutional quality is attained over a medium to long term. The probability that it would have improved in response to short-term FDI ows is less than for the openness 12 Helpman et al. (2008) use common religion as their identifying variable in their paper on trade ows. They also use regulation costs of rm entry, but this drops their number of usable observations by half. In this paper, I use IAB's new indicators on starting a foreign business, available for all 87 FDI-receiving countries in the sample.
variable which could reect stroke-of-a-pen kind of reforms on permitted equity holdings by foreigners. I use instrumental variables (IV) to redress the presumed endogeneity between FDI regulations and FDI inows.
Possible reverse causation between FDI inow and FDI openness implies that errors are not independently and identically distributed leading to inconsistent estimates. Table   10 report the benchmark gravity results without, and with instrumentation of the FDI openness variable by the strength of lease rights index and the availability of land information index, without correcting for selection or heterogeneity biases. The coecient on openness increases signicantly when it is instrumented. In columns 3 and 4, the FDI openness variable is instrumented in a model with corrections for country selection and rm heterogeneity, respectively. The change in the coecients is illustrated in Section 7. that summarize a country's institutional regime (see Figure 2 ).
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high-income OECD countries. All together there are 15 OECD countries in the IAB sample. See Table 13 for the list of countries included.
15 Excluding Papua New Guinea for which equity data could not be conrmed. 16 According to the WGI, its rule of law score measures the extent to which agents have condence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Its government eectiveness score measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Regulatory quality measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. Control of corruption measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests. The scatter plots in Figure 2 exclude outliers Afghanistan and Solomon Islands that score zero on the Ease of arbitration process index and the Extent of judicial assistance index. Serbia is excluded in the WGI dataset. This
Investors considering making heavy investment in a foreign country need to be assured that their investments will not be unjustly expropriated and that in instances of disputes, there is a predictable course for resolution.
An eective arbitration regime for FDI mitigates risk by providing legal security to investors (including assurance of contract enforcement rights, due process, and access to justice). It gives parties autonomy to create systems tailored to their disputes, which foreign investors prefer to court litigation (World Bank Group 2010). Because this index on FDI institutions is specic to how foreign investors resolve contractual or commercial disputes, it is preferable to a generic measure like the rule of law to proxy for the quality of institutions.
According to World Bank Group (2010), countries that score well on these indicators have a strong arbitration legal framework, receive support from local courts for arbitration proceedings and ecient enforcement, adhere to international conventions, and provide autonomy to parties seeking to resolve their commercial disputes. 
5.4
Data on Bilateral Investment Treaty I construct a dataset on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between 30 OECD source countries and 87 IAB host countries using information from UNCTAD's Investment Instruments Online.
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BITs are aimed at promoting and protecting foreign investment. UNCTAD monitors the signing of bilateral investment treaties for the promotion and protection of foreign investment (BITs), which has dramatically risen in number after the 1990s, from around 400 in 1990 to over 2,500 at present.
5.5
Bilateral data on FDI and the Gravity Variables Table 3 report results from a xed-eects model with variables that are only specic to the country pair. All country-specic variables are purged. Consistent with earlier results, distance continues to exert a highly signicant and negative inuence on FDI inows. Having had a prior colonial relationship is also an important determinant. The impact of sharing ethnic languages or the border is mixed.
A major problem with the log-linearized OLS regressions (column 1 in Tables 1, 2 is the probability of being included in the sample, i.e., having a non-zero FDI ow. If countries with active FDI relationships are not randomly selected from the population, and the probability of selection is correlated with independent variables like distance or GDP, then the gravity regression has selection bias, and the OLS coecients are not reliable. This is redressed next.
6.1
Country selection bias
Column 5 in Tables 1-3 reports results after correcting for selection bias using the standard Heckman procedure. First, from the Probit estimates (column 2) of the probability of an FDI relationship existing using the same explanatory variables used to estimate the benchmark equation, inverse Mills ratio is computed. This is then included as a regressor in the second stage, which excludes the identifying variable (FDI establishment index). All the coecients that were signicant in the benchmark regression are also signicant in this biascorrected regression. The elasticity of distance and all GDP related variables are higher than in the benchmark regression indicating that the selection was underestimating their inuence on FDI inow. This means that had countries with zero ows excluded from the country sample in the benchmark regression been included, the benchmark elasticities of the impact of barriers would have been higher. The coecients on FDI institutions and openness were also biased downward earlier, and show up as signicant after the correction. These conrm that the sample selection bias is real and the countries with known zero ows are not a non-random sub-sample.
It is the case that the excluded countries are largely developing countries and the coecients on the traditional determinants of FDI are biased downwards when they are excluded.
Column 6 in all the three tables shows coecients obtained from an econometric solution to incorporate the zeros into the sample by using the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML) model. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) point out that the presence of heteroscedasticity in trade data calls for the use of non log-linearized models. Their method allows the inclusion of zero ows in the sample, but does not seek to explain the problem of zero ows as an empirical regularity caused by heterogeneous productivity. Regardless, when gravity is estimated with trade (not log of trade) as the dependent variable, with several observations as zero, the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method yields signicant and similarly signed coecients to the benchmark regression, especially for distance and colony.
Correcting for zero ows (and the sample selection bias), however, still does not give us consistent estimates when rms are heterogeneous. Helpman et al. (2008) show that the Heckman sample correction is adequate only when rms are aected by FDI barriers in an identical manner. In earlier trade models, à la Krugman (1979) , rms are symmetric and all of them export. Only their volume is constrained by trade costs, not the decision of rms of whether to export. When trade barriers are innite, foreign varieties are still consumed, but at zero quantity of each. In the real world, only a small share of rms export and invest overseas. Because of the sunk costs involved, only the more productive and the protable do so (Melitz 2003 , Helpman et al. 2004 ).
When FDI barriers are lowered, not only does a country attract more investment per rm, but also a greater fraction of rms. These are termed the intensive and extensive margins of FDI. Ignoring the extensive margin misattributes the importance of specic barriers (like distance) in restricting total trade or investment ow, because they conate the impact of FDI barriers on these two separate margins of FDI, and render the coecients inconsistent (Behar and Nelson 2009b) . When FDI barriers go down, existing multinational rms face lower xed or variable costs of investing abroad, so they increase their FDI. At the same time, rms that were not productive enough earlier to incur xed costs of investing abroad are now in a position to do so, and contribute to increased FDI. Both these margins of adjustment must be acknowledged to get an accurate picture of how barriers to FDI aect FDI inows. This issue is resolved next.
6.2
Firm selection bias I follow the two-step methodology proposed by Helpman et al. (2008) to construct another variable from the predicted probability obtained from the Probit selection equation. This new variable controls for unobserved rm heterogeneity (see Appendix C), but does not require rm-level data because the characteristics of marginal investors to dierent destinations can be identied from the variation in the features of the destination countries.
In the second stage, controls derived from the rst stage for both rm heterogeneity and sample selection are included in the model. Column 3 in Tables 1, 2 and 3 reports the main results. It estimates the intensive margin (amount of investment per rm) after controlling for rm heterogeneity and country selection.
The coecient for distance is highly signicant in all three tables. However, compared to the benchmark regression, the elasticity of distance drops by nearly 30 percent in Table 1 , 28 percent in Table 2 , and 22 percent in Table 3 . In Table 2 , which has a more complete list of country-specic explanatory variables, FDI institutions is signicant at the 10 percent level, whereas it was not so in the benchmark version.
In columns 4 and 5 of Tables 1-3, I decompose the country and rm heterogeneity biases to show that the latter is more substantial than the former in standard gravity equations. The dierence in the estimated coecients in column 1 and 3 shows the magnitude of both biases. Column 4 reports results controlling only for heterogeneity bias and not the selection bias. The coecients in this column are closer to those in column 3, explaining that these explain most of the bias in standard gravity regressions. In column 5, where only the sample selection bias is corrected (Heckman selection procedure), the coecients are closer to those in column 1, the benchmark gravity results. I conclude, therefore, that unobserved heterogeneity is a much more serious bias in traditional gravity estimates of FDI than sample selection. First, in Table 4 , I include all the negative FDI values in the sample, increasing the number of observations in the Probit regression (column 2) which is used to predict probabilities to compute controls for the two biases.
The results are comparable to those in Table 2 Table 5 , when the results are compared to the benchmark gravity regression (column 1), heterogeneity bias is shown to be substantial. As in previous results the coecients on distance and GDP fall. FDI institutions remains a signicant determinant of FDI stock in both the benchmark and the bias-corrected models. This is explicable because FDI stock is a discounted total of past FDI ows, and the variables that aect ows can be expected to impact stock dierently. Unlike policy openness which can be reformed with a stroke of a pen, institutions take a long time to evolve. Their quality is therefore associated with the accumulation of FDI ow over the medium to long term.
Third, in lieu of the FDI establishment (time and procedure), I use two alternative identication variables in Table 6 . The rst is just the number of procedures, and the second is the presence of a bilateral investment treaty.
When the benchmark gravity regression estimates are compared with the bias-corrected estimates (columns 3 and 6) under the two dierent specications, the results are in line with the model that used FDI establishment as the identifying variable, and the heterogeneity-adjusted coecients see the upward bias on distance and GDP reduced. FDI institutions is not a signicant determinant of FDI inow in either of the benchmark regressions (columns 1 and 4), but it becomes signicant at the 10 percent level in the bias-corrected model when the number of procedures is used as an identifying variable, but not when BIT is. hold (Table 7) under two specications comparable to Tables 1 and 2 . GDP and distance matter for FDI inows both in the benchmark and bias-corrected models, but the size of their coecients fall in the latter as hypothesized. For ows averaged over a longer time series, FDI openness shows up as signicant under the more stringent second specication whereas in Fifth, when the richest countries in the sample 21 are dropped form the sample, the benchmark coecients of distance and GDP rise signicantly indicating that among less developed countries, the traditional barriers remain important. While the bias-corrected coecients are reduced, they remain high. FDI institutions is a signicant determinant of FDI ows when only market size is a major determinant of FDI; however, it is not signicant when LPI and GDP per capita are included among the regressors in a model that excludes the richest countries.
There are two additional insights. When the sample selection and unobserved heterogeneity biases are corrected by using non-linear least squares (see Appendix C), the results are comparable to those obtained with ordinary least squares regression using the polynomial t of the predicted latent variable (Table 9) . Second, as detailed in an earlier section on possible endogeneity between FDI openness and FDI inows, land-related variables are used to instrument for FDI openness. Table 10 reports results that not only correct for sample and rm selection biases, but also possible reverse causation (endogeneity) between FDI openness and FDI inows. When instrumented, both the magnitude and the signicance of FDI openness increases substantially.
The coecients of other important variables like FDI institutions, GDP and distance, however, do not change as dramatically.
Conclusion
Gravity models have long been a workhorse for explaining trade, investment, and even migration ows between countries. The traditional estimates obtained from log-linearized models of barriers to FDI are, however, not consistent because they do not account for all the information contained in bilateral data, especially between countries that invest zero amounts in each other (country selection problem). These models also do not acknowledge that rms are heterogeneous and only a fraction of them are in a position to invest abroad (rm selection problem). FDI ows between countries i and j are not just a function of low barriers to FDI, but also the fraction of rms that invest in country j from country i. throughout this paper is that it not only captures the geographical distance between two countries, and therefore transaction costs, but distance also reects lack of information and proxies for other frictions. I show that the heterogeneity bias is signicant in all regressions. After it is corrected for, the importance of distance as a barrier to investment, for instance, drops by at least 22 percent compared to the benchmark estimation. Further, I
show 
Ratio of demand for two varieties gives the relative demand:
Multiplying both sides of (15) by p(v 1 ) and take integral w.r.t. v 1 :
Marshallian demand for variety 2 in terms of prices and income is:
The CES price index (true cost of living index) of all varieties is:
All varieties have a constant demand elasticity σ. The Marshallian demand for a variety is:
22 When n increases, utility increases.
Production: A country i rm produces one unit of output with a cost-minimizing combination of inputs (c i a) where a indicates rm-specic productivity and measures the number of bundles of the country's inputs used per unit of output; c i is the cost of the bundle, which is uniform across country i. Monopolistic competition with increasing returns implies decreasing average cost as quantity produced increases [l(x) = f + cx]. Each produces one variety. There is no strategic interaction among rms, and so they only charge a constant mark-up over the marginal cost to maximize prot as follows:
Investment cost across borders: Production through subsidiary in country j by parent rms in country i reduces transport costs, but there exist non-trivial coordination and transaction costs represented by τ ij , in addition to the xed cost of setting up a new plant (which exceeds the xed cost of exporting, from Appendix B). Price in country j diers from price in country i by including bilateral mark-up and transaction costs:
Take E j = Y j . Substituting (19) in (5), and using (16), we get:
Sale by multinational rms from i are protable in j only when inπ ij > 0. This gives the cut-o productivity a ij which indicates that only rms with productivity higher than the cut-o earn positive prots by undertaking FDI. From (20) , the cut-o is as follows:
Equation (21) gives the extensive margin of FDI. The cut-o a ij is higher, i.e., the number of rms from country i that invest abroad increases when the GDP of host country increases and the xed and variable costs of undertaking FDI fall. Total value of FDI from i to j is given by the following equation, where G(a ij ) indicates the fraction of rms that are in a position to invest abroad and N (i) is the number of rms.
General equilibrium: We assume total income of country i is a summation of sales by all its rms at home and abroad.
Dene the outward multi-lateral resistance as
B Appendix: Firm Productivity, Exports and Horizontal FDI
The model is from Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) who generalize Melitz (2003) to deal with heterogeneous rms and horizontal FDI. Firms vary by productivity. The inverse of a,
, is the rm's productivity which it discovers after entering the industry. Its variable cost is c θ(v)
, xed cost is cf D and it charges a marked-up price, p = c ρθ (v) to maximize prot as follows, akin to (20): If a rm sells in a foreign country with the same demand elasticity but dierent demand function, and faces transport and transaction cost as well as xed export cost, cf X , it makes additional prot from exports as follows:
Firms with productivity Θ D < Θ < Θ j X produce for the domestic market. Those with productivity Θ > Θ j X export. A rm that undertakes horizontal FDI builds a second plant in country j incurring xed cost cf I and variable cost cj θ to reap prot:
As long as f X > f I and c j > cτ the rm faces a tradeo. By choosing FDI, it gives up savings on the scale-induced lower variable cost at home for higher xed cost abroad. For the case in which demand level is the same in two countries, B j = B, c j = c and f I > τ σ−1 f X > f D , the model shows:
This leads to a natural sorting of rms by productivity. Only those with the highest productivity serve the foreign market through horizontal FDI (subsidiary sales). The empirical implication of this theory is that we need to control for the fraction of rms that undertake FDI to obtain consistent estimates from a gravity estimation of investment.
C Appendix: Implementing the Gravity Model with Firm Heterogeneity
The empirical strategy depends on what assumption is made about the distribution of rm productivity. The benchmark results in this paper do not make any assumption. Helpman et al. (2008) , however, do, for their main results obtained using a non-linear estimation as follows. Firm productivity is assumed to follow a truncated 
. The extensive margin V ij is then specied as:
To operationalize (25), prot of a rm with the lowest variable cost in country i is looked at. If this rm does not nd it protable to undertake FDI, then no rm from country i will. This rm's ratio of prots to xed FDI costs gives the latent variable Z ij as follows:
With (6) and above, the extensive margin cut-o and the latent variable are related as
This gives:
In the gravity equation (11), w ij is estimated byŵ ij (δ) = ln{exp[δ(ẑ ij )] − 1} in a non-linear regression.
z ij is obtained as follows. First, a Probit model predicts probabilities of positive FDI from a regression that includes the standard gravity variables, host country FDI barriers and dummies for source countries. This also includes an identifying variable number of procedures and time required to establish a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary which is excluded in the second stage. From the predicted probabilities, an inverse Mills ratio ( η ij ) is computed. Because the inverse Mills ratio would be undened for predicted probabilities close to 1, all probabilities > 0.9999999 are converted to equal 0.9999999. To add to the inverse Mills ratio, normalized predicted values,ẑ ij = Φ −1 (p ij ) are generated. Together, the propensity to invest abroad,ẑ ij =ẑ ij + η ij represents rm selection, as shown by Helpman et al. (2008) . This is a positive function ofp and an estimate of the latent variable Z ij . As Behar et al. (2009a) explain, attaching a Pareto distribution to rm productivity maps to a consistent estimate of the number of rms protable enough to invest abroad. The second stage includes controls for rm selection ln(e δẑij − 1) and country selection ( η ij ). In Table 9 , I report results from the non-linear least squares regressions, whereŵ ij (δ) is represented by Delta. In the remaining tables (1 to 8, and Wheeler, David and Ashoka Mody. (1992) . International Investment Location Decisions: The Case of U.S.
Firms. Journal of International Economics, vol. 33(1-2), pp. 57-76. Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; robust standard errors (clustering by source country) Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; robust standard errors (clustering by source country) Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; robust standard errors (clustering by source country) Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; robust standard errors (clustering by source country) Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; robust standard errors (clustering by source country) Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; robust standard errors (clustering by source country) Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; robust standard errors (clustering by source country) Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; robust standard errors (clustering by source country) Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; robust standard errors (clustering by source country) Notes: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; robust standard errors Index (0-100) of averaged normalized scores of, i) the number of preand post-incorporation procedural steps involved in establishing a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary and ii) the number of days needed to go through each of the procedural steps.
IAB FDI Procedures
Normalized score of the number of pre-and post-incorporation procedural steps involved in establishing a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary IAB FDI Openness Index (0 to 100) of average foreign equity ownership permitted across 11 broad sectors (grouped from 33 sub-sectors) IAB FDI Institutions Index (0 to 100) created by averaging two separate IAB indexes, the Ease of arbitration process index and the Extent of judicial assistance index. The former assesses the ease of the arbitration process, and whether there are restrictions or other obstacles that the disputing parties face in seeking a resolution to their dispute; and the latter measures the interaction between domestic courts and arbitral tribunals, including the courts' willingness to assist during the arbitration process and their eectiveness in enforcing arbitration awards IAB Logistics Performance Index (LPI) Composite index (1 to 5) based on a survey of freight forwarders and express carriers on a country's, i) quality of trade and transport infrastructure, ii) customs eciency, iii) timeliness of shipments, iv) ease of arranging competitively-priced shipment, v) logistics competence, and vi) ability to track and trace consignments LPI Strength of Lease Rights This scores countries (from 0 to 100) on the security of legal rights they oer to investors interested in leasing industrial landwhether or not foreign and domestic companies are treated dierently and whether the leased land can be subleased, subdivided, mortgaged, or used as collateral IAB Availability of Land Information Index (0 to 100) which compares economies on the availability of key information to interested private parties through land administration institutions IAB 
